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Abstract 
 The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the relationship 
between government size and economic growth. Using time series 
methodologies applied to annual data for Italy, the effect of public 
expenditure, unemployment, and fiscal reforms on economic activity have 
been analysed. The data used in these analyses have been collected and 
shown in Forte (2011). The analysis covered a very long period, 1861-2008. 
Our results show the presence of a non-linear relationship between the size 
of the public sector (measured by the share of government expenditure over 
GDP) and the economic growth rate for Italy. In general, the presence of an 
inverted “U-shape” curve, which emerges for the last two decades, suggests 
that expenditure cuts might be faster than GDP dynamic. This result is in line 
with recent empirical literature on this issue. Interestingly, for the monarchic 
years, it has been found that the zero budget constraint provoked a slower 
aggregate income variation. 
 
Keywords: Economic growth, fiscal consolidation, BARS curve, Italy, time 
series 
 
Introduction 
 This paper is devoted to the analysis of the very long-run relation 
between the size of public expenditure and the GDP growth in Italy from 
1861, the year in which the Italian state was created, to 2008. Thus, this was 
the last year before the great economic and financial crisis, which has 
affected all European Union (EU) countries, generating a sudden reduction 
of GDP and a corresponding increase of fiscal imbalances as well as the 
public debt/GDP ratios. The issue of their sustainability has emerged 
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particularly in Ireland and in Southern European countries. Prior to the crisis, 
there was little difference in the bond prices of the various Euro zone 
countries. The role played by sovereign spreads in the Euro zone has 
increased dramatically with the onset of the crisis. However, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) has initiated a program of non-conventional banking 
refinancing, which has significantly helped the banking system. Also, it has 
wiped out the default’s risk of euro as a whole. European governments, 
especially the Greek, the Italian, the Spanish, and the Portuguese have ones 
implemented programs aimed at covering budget deficits and banking 
refinancing (in the case of Madrid). Nevertheless, the consolidation efforts 
have caused high unemployment rate and further decrease of GDP. As a 
result, this increases the debt to GDP ratios. Thus, Italy’s debt/GDP ratio 
before the crisis was gradually diminishing. In 2007, it was close to the 
100% threshold. After the crisis, it was raised continuously; hence in 2014, it 
exceeded 130% of the GDP. Subsequently, the question arises on how to 
pursue a consolidation policy friendly to GDP growth. The main issue is 
whether the consolidation should be done chiefly by tax increase or by 
expenditures cuts6. 
 Governments currently absorb a sizeable share of society’s resources. 
On the other hand, throughout history, high levels of economic development 
have been attained under institutions and various policies that fostered 
government interventions (Afonso and Jalles, 2011). 
 While public expenditure, in general, is necessary to have a market 
economy capable of operating correctly as well in order to foster the 
aggregate income growth, its continuous expansion cannot be assumed to be 
consistent with the long-run maximization of GDP growth. Indeed, increase 
in government expenditure implies an increased tax burden, which may 
hamper growth, or a deficit that may increase public debt with an increased 
cost of its service and an increased risk of insolvency. In addition, a growing 
share of this debt in foreign hands generates a deficit in the current accounts 
balance of payments that may represent an obstacle to the economic growth. 
Nevertheless, even if it is true that beyond a given limit, public expenditure 
may reduce economic growth, it may also improve the quality of GDP. A 
high rate of growth accompanied by a too unequal distribution of resources 
could conflict with the objective of maximizing general welfare and social 
cohesion. Thus, this does not reflect the actual individual preferences of a 
mature democracy. High defence expenditures may be necessary for some 
countries to achieve and defend an independent status and their free society 
                                                            
6 The massive spending programs and new regulations adopted by many countries around 
the world in response to the economic crisis of 2008 have drawn renewed attention to the 
role of government in the economy (Kahn, 2011). 
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institutions. In addition, an optimal equilibrium should not necessarily imply 
the GDP growth maximization and pose the question of the long-run inter-
temporal optimal distribution of the GDP growth rate. 
 With this premises, in the remainder of the paper, we analysed the 
issue of the size of Government expenditure in relation to GDP growth in 
Italy since 1861. This was done as follows. Section 2 is devoted to discuss 
recent researches concerning the government size-economic growth nexus. 
In the following section, the data used in our empirical analyses are shown. 
Also, they were divided into different periods and sub periods of the 158 
years of the Italian state under examination. Thus, this is accompanied with 
the results and comments. Finally, Section 4 gives the conclusions. 
 
Recent Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Government 
Size and Economic Growth 
 A recent approach to the government size effects on economic 
growth is centered on the BARS curve (Barro, 1989; Armey, 1995; Rahn and 
Fox, 1996; Scully, 1994, 1995), which relates the rate of economic growth 
with government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP). Therefore, this is 
considered as a peculiar proxy of the State dimension in the economy. 
 The theoretical foundation of what we are affirming which dates back 
to the concept of “optimal size of the government”, was theorized by Armey 
who proposed the homonym curve. Analogous to the Laffer’s curve (which 
outlines using a graph of an “inverted U”, the relationship between tax 
revenue and the average tax rate), the Armey’s curve shows the relationship 
between public expenditure (expressed as a share of GDP) and the change in 
the general welfare of the country (expressed as a rate of economic growth). 
Therefore, this shows the same shape of a parabola with the concavity facing 
downwards. 
 According to Armey (1995), with very low levels of public 
expenditure, the State would fail to ensure contract compliance and 
protection of property rights. Hence, it would result in a zero rate of 
economic growth. On the contrary, with very high shares of public 
expenditure, citizens would have little incentive to invest and produce. This 
is made possible since the levels of fiscal burden would be exorbitant, and 
the growth rate would be affected. Consequently, increase in expenditure 
which increases at low levels of intervention in the economy, generates a 
strong boost to economic activity. On the other hand, fiscal expansions at 
high expenditure levels, results in a slowdown in economic activity. There is, 
thus, an optimal value of public expenditure share. 
 Countries can be thought to be either in a “balanced growth” state, in 
which per capita GDP growth fluctuates around the normal long-term rate of 
about two percent annually, or in transition – meaning sustained growth in an 
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above or below normal rate until they reach the balanced growth state (Kahn, 
2011). 
 Most of the “first generation” empirical literature (prior to the late 
90’s-early 00’s) on the relationship between government size and economic 
growth has been based on the linear formulation of the link between public 
expenditure (as a proxy of the size of the public sector) and GDP growth. 
The evidence provided by this first generation literature is not conclusive, 
although the number of papers in support of a negative relationship between 
public expenditure and growth is slightly larger. 
 In particular, Rubinson (1977), Ram (1986), and Grossman (1988, 
1987) found evidence of a positive relationship between public expenditure 
and growth. Landau (1983), Grier and Tullock (1987), Barro (1990b), and 
Engen and Skinner (1992) provided evidence in line with a negative 
relationship. On the other hand, Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Hsieh 
and Lai (1994) found no significant relationship. 
 Alesina and Ardagna (2009), studying the reduction in public 
debt/GDP ratio in previous episodes of consolidation, have found that in the 
past, large public debt has been reduced in a rapid way due to sustained 
growth. This was the case for the reduction of huge public debts of the 
belligerent countries after World War II and for the U.S. in the Nineties. 
Substantially, without any increase in tax rates or significant cuts in public 
expenditure, the large deficit has been turned into a great surplus. A different 
example is represented by UK consolidation at the end of the World War II, 
with a debt/GDP equals to 200%. Yet, the country did not suffer a financial 
crisis due to debt unsustainability; thanks to the confidence given by the 
markets to UK fiscal authorities (historically believed to be reliable) and the 
subsequent consolidation realized during the period of the Thatcherian 
reforms (Magazzino, 2010). 
 The econometric evidence has shown, in time, that the “progressive 
consolidation” processes tend to more likely to succeed than a consolidation 
with “cold shower”. Some of these results are probably justified by the 
introduction of structural reforms. This is alongside with the gradual 
consolidation and which constitute a determinant of its success. 
 Empirical results show that the difference in success rates between 
the two alternative types of consolidation becomes much lower than the 
average in the case of consolidations. Therefore, this is implemented because 
of a strong increase in debt. If this is true, countries with higher levels of 
indebtedness that are facing serious problems of sustainability should opt for 
a “cold shower” consolidation. This is aimed at re-establishing their 
credibility as well as their market confidence, so as to contain the “snowball 
effect”, which otherwise would aggravate their already precarious situation. 
Due to the limits of tax increase, in relation to their supply side deflationary 
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effects on growth, the attention must turn to the expenditure side. Moreover, 
here it is crucial to explore how much the BARS optimal size of the public 
expenditure/GDP has been surpassed. Furthermore, the question about the 
political sustainability of these policies then arises. The Barrios et al. (2011) 
analysis focused on 14 European countries7 dimension, regarding the stance 
of manoeuvre for each country. Consequently, they considered public 
expenditure cuts as an instrument of consolidation in a bundle composed of 
five variables. Therefore, these variables have different weights according to 
the situation of the considered countries as for: i. the ability to implement 
expenditure cuts, feasible in countries with a relatively large and inefficient 
public sector or in states with high levels of social transfers; ii. the possibility 
to raise revenues, feasible in countries with a contained fiscal pressure or 
which have significant differences between revenue and expenditure; iii. the 
possibility of increasing the participation to work by, for example, age 
retirement (30%); iv. the possibility of privatizing public assets (5%); and v. 
the possibility of pursuing an expansive monetary policy, where the country 
does not belong to a monetary union (5%). Furthermore, the results of the 
econometric analysis conducted allows the division of the analysed countries 
into four groups: 1) the first group (consisting of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Italy) represent countries that face the greatest challenges in fiscal 
consolidation. Italy and Greece, however, have more leeway than Ireland and 
Portugal. Italy, in fact, may act both on revenue side (raising taxes in the 
black economy, estimated at 22% of GDP) and on labour participation; 2) 
the second group, which includes France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom, faces a fiscal threat that is moderately high. Hence, this 
has a lower room for manoeuvre. Worthy of note is the case of Spain, for 
which the results show a large tax challenge lower than that which was 
perceived by the markets until 2011. While the country has registered 
deficits which were very high in recent years, it is also true that before the 
crisis, between 2004 and 2007, the country had achieved budget surpluses. 
Despite the rapid increase in debt, it has sufficient room for manoeuvre 
(increasing the tax rate, relatively low, or both increasing retirement age and 
occupation); 3) Poland and Hungary form the third group, which is 
characterized by small fiscal challenges and medium-large room of 
manoeuvre; and 4) the fourth group includes Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, 
without any budget threat. 
                                                            
7 The paper considered two dimensions of the issue. The first dimension was based on five 
variables, each weighted differently: i. the level of debt relative to GDP and to government 
revenue (with a weight of 30% and 10% respectively); ii. the level of the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio (weight: 25%); iii. pressures on bond markets, with a distinction between the yields on 
government bond (10%) and the share of debt held by foreign investors (10%); iv. the 
expected GDP growth (10%); and v. the indebtedness of private sector-to-GDP (5%). 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.7  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
154 
 The analysis conducted by Forte and Magazzino (2011) revealed that, 
for the EU-27 member States, the peak of the BARS curve is attained for an 
expenditure of 37.29% of GDP, while the average ratio is 47.90% i.e. 10 p.p. 
more. For the twelve EU countries for whom an individual time series 
analysis was meaningful (because of the availability of data), they found that 
the peak of the BARS curve ranges from 35.39 for Belgium and 35.52 for 
The Netherlands to 43.50 for UK and 44.47 for Ireland. The minimum 
deviation from the level of the public expenditure that coincides with the 
peak of the BARS curve is that of Ireland with only 2.27%, and followed by 
UK with 7.67 p.p. in excess. The maximum deviation is that of Belgium (of 
about 18%), followed by Denmark (with a percentage of about 17%). As for 
the 27 EU member countries, a country having a public expenditure/GDP 
ratio above 10% the peak, on average, suffers a diminution in the GDP 
growth rate of 2.1%. Moreover, an increase of 1 percentage point in the 
variation of public expenditure approximately corresponds to a 0.04% 
reduction in the acceleration rate of economic activity. However, the 
considered European countries are very heterogeneous in terms of the peak 
of the BARS curve. 
 Empirical findings in Dalena and Magazzino (2012) on the 
relationship between public expenditure and revenue in Italy between 1862 
and 1993 show that the “Tax-and-Spend” argument received empirical 
support from the liberal period data. In contrast, the interwar years are in line 
with the “Spend-and-Tax” hypothesis. Finally, the “Fiscal Synchronization” 
hypothesis emerges in the republican ages. 
 With regards to the public debt growth nexus in reconstructing a 
macro regional government deficit of Italy, Buiatti et al. (2014) show that the 
ultimate cause of the accumulation of the public debt of Italy lies in the 
extraordinary fiscal imbalance of the Southern regions. The results call for 
deep institutional reforms of the fiscal decentralization which has so far been 
implemented in Italy. Kourtellos et al. (2013), investigating the 
heterogeneous effects of debt on growth using public debt as a threshold 
variable, found strong evidence for threshold effects based on democracy. 
Thus, this implies that higher public debt results in lower growth for 
countries in the Low-Democracy regime. Teles and Mussolini (2014) 
proposes a theoretical model of endogenous growth that demonstrates how 
the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product ratio should negatively 
influence the effect of fiscal policy on growth. This effect occurs because 
government indebtedness extracts a portion of young people’s savings to pay 
interest on debts. Wöhlbier et al. (2014) examines potential challenges 
arising at Member State level from the need and scope for either 
consolidating on the revenue side or shifting taxes away from labour. Spain, 
Malta and Slovenia show some room for raising tax, which may be used to 
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contribute to fiscal consolidation in addition to expenditure control. Most of 
the new Member States (the only exception being Hungary) such as Spain 
and the UK, display tax-to-GDP ratios significantly below the EU average. 
This is with the UK and Slovenia being very close to the threshold. Such low 
tax-to-GDP ratios also reflect less generous welfare systems. Belgium, 
Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland, and the UK 
faces strong consolidation challenges due to serious sustainability issues in 
the medium run or the long-run. 
 With a different approach, Blume and Voigt (2013) find that 
constitutionally entrenched spending limits are correlated with lower total 
government expenditure. Also, the transparency of a nation’s budget is 
correlated with higher government effectiveness as well as lower corruption. 
  
Methodology, Data, and Empirical Results 
 In our applied analyses, the ARIMAX (AutoRegressive Integrated 
Moving Average with Exogenous Variables) models were used. However, it 
was used together with Newey and West’s correction regarding 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 Furthermore, we used the data recently reconstructed by Forte (2011) 
for Italy. In Table 1 below, we presented some descriptive statistics of the 
relevant public finance’ variables: the real GDP growth rate (y), the share of 
government expenditure over GDP (G), the share of public revenue/GDP (T), 
the public (B) and fluctuating debt as a GDP ratio, and the primary 
budget/GDP (D). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of relevant public finance variables (Italy, 1861-2008) 
Variable Mean Median Inter-Quartile 
Range 
Standard 
Deviation 
Economic growth rate 2.16 2.27 5.00 6.90 
Public 
expenditure/GDP 
26.41 24.39 21.62 15.47 
Public revenue/GDP 22.66 18.50 15.56 12.40 
Primary budget/GDP -3.10 -0.79 7.57 6.61 
Public debt/GDP 78.49 80.61 41.96 27.58 
Fluctuating debt/GDP 32.07 21.39 36.79 21.78 
Source: our elaborations on Forte (2011) data. 
 
 However, the average of the 150 years conceals the huge differences 
in the five periods presented in Table 2. It respectively covers the 
“incubation age” from 1861 to 1894, the “take off” age from 1896 to 1914, 
“the industrialization age” from 1919 to 1939, the “neo capitalistic age” from 
1946 to 1972, and the “European new age” from 1993 to 2008. During these 
periods, one should also consider the important political changes which have 
influenced the Government dimension and the fiscal and monetary policy. 
The first period, of incubations, has been divided in our analysis into two 
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sub-periods. They are the democratic governments of the historical right 
from 1861 and the sub-period of the democratic governments of the 
historical left from 1895. Subsequently, the take off period largely coincides 
with the so-called Giolittian era of centre. In the last part of the period, the 
first great world war began, which caused an unusual growth in public 
expenditure and an inflation that reduced the related increase of the public 
debt GDP ratio. Therefore, the subsequent period for most part coincided 
with the fascist era. However, in its last part, there was a second great world 
war with Italy. At the end, the country was divided into two parts. It was 
largely destroyed which resulted to a successive post war reconstruction. In 
1946, the last year of this period, the country’s institutional architecture 
changed from the monarchic form of the state to a republican one. The long 
subsequent neo-capitalist period, from the political point of view, may be 
defined as that of the first Republic characterized by the proportional 
electoral system and the confrontation between the traditional parties. 
Therefore, this was under the division of the world in the two blocs of the 
democratic countries and the communist countries. Notwithstanding, in Italy, 
it had undergo important political changes which influences the government 
dimension and the fiscal and monetary policy which may imply to subdivide 
it into three or four sub-periods: the initial one of centre ranging from 1947 
to 1961; the second of centre-left ranging from 1961 to 1972; the third sub-
period of “national solidarity” ranging from 1973 to 1981; and the fourth of 
new centre-left ranging from 1982 to 1992. The last period, of the Second 
Republic, is characterized by the emergence of new parties and political 
coalitions under the changes of the electoral system and by the problems of 
difficult reforms required by the membership of the European Monetary 
Union. 
 On one hand, we may observe a continuous growth of public 
expenditure on GDP from 10.7% in the incubation age, to 17.44% in the 
take-off age, and to 23.69 in the industrialization age. Afterwards, it remains 
at the same percentage in the neo capitalistic age and it jumps to 47% in the 
European new age. On the other hand, GDP growth rate which was 0.75% in 
the incubation age, increases to 2.37% in the industrialization age, to 4.25% 
in the neo capitalistic age, and decline to 1.43% in the European new age. 
Clearly, in the first four periods, the increase of public expenditure on GDP 
has been accompanied by a GDP growth. Thus, in the last age, the great 
average increase of public expenditure is accompanied by a more than 
proportional decline in the GDP growth rate. Obviously, the time distinction 
in five periods involves arbitrary elements that influence the values of the 
resulting average changes in the public expenditure to GP ratios and in the 
GDP growth rates. Nevertheless, what emerges is that the BARS’s law as for 
the effects of the ratio of public expenditure to GDP on the GDP growth rate 
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was confirmed. Hence, this was done for Italy long-run trend. However, we 
need an econometric research to find the BARS curve public expenditure on 
GDP behaviour and its optimal level. 
Figure 1. Public expenditure, revenue, and economic growth (%, Italy, 1862-1918) 
 
 
Table 2. Public finance variables and economic growth (Italy, 1861-2008) 
Mean 
Variable 1861-
1876 
1877-
1895 
1896-
1914 
1919-
1939 
1946-
1972 
1973-
1992 
1993-
2008 
Y 0.9795 0.5938 2.0394 2.5848 5.1457 2.5540 1.3292 
G 9.4029 11.0404 11.3597 21.2117 28.4892 46.3800 49.8063 
T 9.4715 11.0461 11.4318 19.6194 24.8652 35.8868 45.0926 
D 0.0687 0.0045 0.0723 -4.7254 -2.4945 -3.4000 3.1668 
B 64.0867 91.8220 85.4657 100.3404 37.5309 71.8069 110.8746 
Final value-Starting value 
Variable 1861-
1876 
1877-
1895 
1896-
1914 
1919-
1939 
1946-
1972 
1973-
1992 
1993-
2008 
Y 1.5597 0.5917 -3.1691 8.1922 -10.5184 -6.1136 -0.1529 
G 0.9300 2.8835 4.9593 -12.2542 13.7457 19.5000 -7.2000 
T 5.0822 3.0569 1.1578 -15.1731 17.7808 15.3046 -0.0808 
D 4.4137 -0.5812 -5.4952 20.3594 7.1000 6.1000 -0.1644 
B 48.7620 29.8320 -32.0552 -65.0895 11.1691 54.6314 -9.0033 
 
 The correlation between output growth and public expenditure during 
the whole period was almost absent (-0.06, which, moreover, is the same 
value assumed by the correlation coefficient in the years 1862-1914), while 
-1
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Source: Forte (2011)
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the negative association is also confirmed in the interwar period (-0.25). 
In the three sub-periods considered here, the variation in economic activity 
on an average was equal to 1.35% between 1862 and 1914, 1.90% between 
1915 and 1947, and 3.53% between 1948 and 2008. The variation in public 
expenditure/GDP ratio, however, was equal respectively to 3.51%, 0.93%, 
and 1.65%. Therefore, in the post-unitary and up to the First World War, the 
highest increase in expenditure/GDP and the lowest growth rate were 
recorded. Based on the concerns of the average expenditure levels, in the 
years of Historical Right (1862-1876), the government size was equal to 
9.40%. Then, it grew to 11.09% with the Historical Left (1877-1896), and to 
17.89% with the Giolitti era and the Great War (1897-1920). Fascism and the 
Second World War did increase this ratio up to an average of 23.69% (1921-
1947), whilst between 1948 and 1979, it decreased to 20.16%. Finally, 
among 1980 and 2008, there was an excessive increase which led this ratio to 
44.32%. 
Figure 2. Public expenditure, revenue, and economic growth (%, Italy, 1919-2008) 
 
  
By analysing the dynamics of the budget balance in relation to GDP, 
it stood on an effective average deficit of 1.97% during the Historical Right 
period. Yet, with Historical Left, there were no sudden upheavals as the 
average deficit was 0.20%. The Giolitti years and the First World War 
produced a high medium deficit (5.40%). With fascism, there was a 
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subsequent rupture of the combination, since the increase in revenue was 
lower than that of expenditure which produces a budget deficit equal to 
8.47%. In the period of 1948-1979 together with a decrease in expenditure, 
there was a stagnation of the average revenue. This was such that the 
deficit/GDP ratio decreased (3.98%). Finally, from 1980 to 2008, the robust 
increase in expenditure has accompanied the less accented increase in 
revenue which results in marked deficits (7.32%). 
 The debt/GDP in 1989 exceeded the threshold of 90%. Thus, 
according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), it represents a secular weight that 
has a significant impact on economic growth in the long-run (and often lasts 
for two decades or more). Since that year, that ratio has not returned below 
90% anymore. Keeping the estimated threshold by Cecchetti et al. (2010) to 
be equal to 85%, we found that the value was exceeded in 1987. In addition, 
the existence of a negative relationship between debt/GDP ratio and output 
growth in the period 1861-2010 is confirmed by the results of Balassone et 
al. (2011). Obviously, a bilateral correspondence exists between debt and 
growth, but the normal recessions last only for one year. Therefore, it cannot 
explain a period of two decades of malaise. It is more likely that the growth 
constraints have the origin in the government’s need for raising taxes, as well 
as in lower investment expenditure. Thus, public expenditure provides an 
incentive in the short term with a secular decline in the long-run. 
 As the cross-correlograms show, the low correlation of roughly 0 
(0.08) represents the correlation between the public expenditure lagged 10 
years and the actual real growth rate, or equivalently, the correlation between 
the actual public expenditure and the real growth rate 10 years ahead. 
Similarly, a low correlation (-0.09) between 10-lags real economic growth 
and 10-lags public expenditure was found. 
 Therefore, the analysis presented here continues with the estimation 
of possible non-linear effects of public expenditure, assuming that the 
growth rate is a positive function of aggregate income, but a negative 
function of its square: 
[1]  Yt = α + β1Gt + β2G2t + γUt + εt 
where: t are the indices associated to each year; Y is the rate of output 
growth; G corresponds to government expenditure as a percentage of GDP; 
U is a set of control variable in order to capture the business cycle, such as 
the unemployment rate; and εt is the stochastic component. Thus, the 
presence of the BARS curve is verified if H0: β1 > 0 and H0: β2 < 0 cannot be 
rejected. 
 The second-degree term indicates a diminishing marginal 
productivity of public expenditure. The share of expenditure on GDP that 
maximizes economic growth based on quadratic equation in [1] can be 
deduced by the formula [2]. Thus, after differentiation, the income with 
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respect to expenditure is given as: 
[2]  G* = -b/2c 
Table 3. Estimates for the BARS curve (Italy, 1861-1914) 
Dependent Variable: 
y 
1861-1876 1877-1895 1896-1914 
G 1.3371** (0.6675) 1.5113*** (0.5458) 1.0243*** 
(0.3994) 
G2 -3.5288*** (1.5866) -4.4504** (2.0299) -2.9239*** 
(1.0692) 
T 6.4573*** (1.9567) 2.80871*** 
(0.8150) 
1.8455 (1.8565) 
Wars -12.4281*** 
(1.9651) 
2.2157** (1.1341) -2.2328 (1.9740) 
Fiscal Reforms 13.9752*** (2.3790) 4.6426*** (1.2165) 2.6420 (1.6874) 
P -1.1123*** (0.0876) -0.8175*** (0.2314) -0.8293*** 
(0.3052) 
Population 8.5543** (4.0666) 5.7867* (3.52109) 47.0235** 
(18.5940) 
D 0.1578** (0.0823) 2.6723*** (0.1964) 2.5987* (1.5839) 
B 0.2382** (0.1337) 1.0151*** (0.0671) 0.1669** (0.0894) 
Constant -3.7076** (1.9022) -3.0024** (1.4606) -2.5300** 
(1.0159) 
N 14 19 19 
ARMA (1,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
Wald χ2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC -91.5192 -131.357 -123.6007 
BIC -97.2707 -136.0792 -128.3229 
L 36.7596 60.6785 56.8004 G� 9.40 11.04 11.36 
G* 18.95 16.98 17.52 
G*-G� 9.55 5.94 6.16 
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 Applying time series methodologies, the estimates presented in Table 
3 show that the optimal public expenditure share from World War II till 
today, is equal to 40.50%. By including the unemployment rate in the 
analysis, it drops to 37.39%. Finally, inserting as an explanatory variable, a 
dummy that controls for enacted tax reforms, we arrive at 35.32%. 
 Therefore, one can note that these values do not differ much amongst 
them. Above all, they are in line with the estimates (again for Italy in the 
second post-war, but with different sources of data) by Forte and Magazzino 
(2011), Pevcin (2008), and Magazzino (2008). Moreover, it is interesting to 
underline that tax reforms undertaken in this period have shown a brake on 
growth. In addition, it has generated tax restrains rather than lightening. 
 The estimates with respect to the previous time intervals confirm the 
presence of a BARS curve (Table 4). Between 1862 and 1914, the optimal 
government size was equal to 13.96% which is in line with the government 
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size of that historical period (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2007). This occurs 
when the policies budget were inspired by orthodox (or neutral) finance. 
Leroy-Beaulieu (1879) argued that a tax pressure equal to 12% of domestic 
production was already exorbitant and gravid of the danger for growth and 
economic freedom. 
Table 4. Estimates for the BARS curve (Italy, 1919-2008) 
Table 4. 
Estimates for the 
BARS curve 
(Italy, 1919-
2008)Dependent 
Variable: y 
1919-1939 1946-1972 1973-1992 1993-2008 1973-2008 
G 6.0211* 
(3.1056) 
2.6106* 
(1.4747) 
15.4875** 
(6.4367) 
14.8580* 
(9.3122) 
4.9463*** 
(1.1089) 
G2 -15.3661* 
(8.2019) 
-5.7140*** 
(2.0360) 
-22.9142* 
(11.4261) 
-20.9493* 
(12.7051) 
-6.5750*** 
(3.2191) 
T 6.8128 
(7.9333) 
-2.1202* 
(1.1874) 
-4.9513*** 
(1.0607) 
-7.3659*** 
(2.1236) 
-6.7141*** 
(2.5046) 
Fiscal Reforms 7.1931*** 
(3.0175) 
2.7147* 
(1.5980) 
-0.5706 
(1.0977) 
0.0175 
(0.2789) 
0.0538 
(0.0736) 
p -0.1908*** 
(0.0490) 
-0.9192*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.7567*** 
(0.0808) 
-0.6349* 
(0.3775) 
-0.5911*** 
(0.0857) 
Population 12.9548* 
(6.8745) 
3.4621*** 
(1.3159) 
21.9466*** 
(0.1216) 
32.5681 
(30.6301) 
6.1155* 
(3.1701) 
u - -0.5773*** 
(0.0891) 
-1.3748*** 
(0.5238) 
-0.0217 
(0.2615) 
-0.1401* 
(0.0782) 
Openness - 5.5310** 
(2.2927) 
22.4014*** 
(6.2480) 
17.57691*** 
(3.3392) 
-3.9690 
(4.5948) 
D -0.5653* 
(0.3277) 
1.4865* 
(0.8515) 
-0.3977*** 
(0.0537) 
-0.0990 
(0.0844) 
-0.1547 
(0.1959) 
B -0.0230 
(0.0265) 
0.0453 
(0.1130) 
-0.7766** 
(0.3518) 
-0.6312*** 
(0.0328) 
-0.1459** 
(0.0594) 
Constant -12.3832 
(7.8307) 
-6.6083*** 
(0.5367) 
23.7629*** 
(13.9887) 
40.2839 
(31.5446) 
6.7186 
(5.8412) 
N 21 26 20 15 35 
ARMA (0,1) (0,1) (1,1) (0,1) (0,0) 
Wald χ2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC -120.3066 -106.5408 -88.5696 -53.5277 -155.1933 
BIC -128.6627 -117.8636 -98.5269 -59.9002 -167.6361 
l 52.1533 44.2704 34.2848 17.7639 69.5966 G� 21.21 28.49 35.43 46.38 49.81 
G* 19.59 22.84 33.79 35.46 37.61 
G*-G� -1.62 -5.65 -1.64 -10.92 -12.20 
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 In those years, the average ratio of expenditure/GDP was still below 
both values mentioned above (10.69%). In the inter-war period, this 
threshold rises to 24.42%. This was in line with the 25% held by Keynes 
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(1936) as a tolerable maximum. In addition, the average share amounted to 
the same values (26.21%). Finally, with the Second Republic, marked 
differences were recorded between optimal expenditure (40.60%) and its 
average (47.09%). This was with obvious negative effects on economic 
growth as was previously highlighted. 
Table 5. Estimates for the BARS curve (Italy, 1861-2008) 
Dependent 
Variable: y 
1861-1939 1946-2008 1861-2008 
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3c 
G -0.0060 
(0.0146) 
0.0819 * 
(0.0482) 
0.1586 
*** 
(0.0362) 
0.6091 
*** 
(0.0675) 
0.0217 
*** 
(0.0061) 
0.6301 
*** 
(0.0360) 
G2 - -0.2375 
** 
(0.1154) 
- -1.0361 
*** 
(0.3053) 
- -1.5263 
*** 
(0.2621) 
Population 0.2306 ** 
(0.0995) 
0.2231 ** 
(0.1024) 
2.4363 
*** 
(0.3065) 
3.4840 
*** 
(0.4178) 
-0.0236 
(0.0650) 
0.0258 
(0.0687) 
p -0.0066 
(0.0276) 
-0.0013 
(0.0324) 
-0.0247 
(0.0181) 
-0.0259 
(0.0166) 
-0.0508 
*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0581 
*** 
(0.0100) 
Post WWI 0.0376 
(0.0376) 
0.0281 
(0.0485) 
- - 0.0565 
*** 
(0.0210) 
0.0753 
*** 
(0.0228) 
Post WWII - - - - 0.3035 
*** 
(0.0395) 
0.3335 
*** 
(0.0418) 
Post 1992 - - 0.0372 
*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0247 ** 
(0.0123) 
0.0536 
*** 
(0.0199) 
0.0366 * 
(0.0214) 
Constant -0.8494 * 
(0.5057) 
-0.7502 
(0.5987) 
-21.1920 
*** 
(2.8749) 
-31.5805 
*** 
(4.0422) 
0.2394 
(0.5889) 
-0.3591 
(0.6529) 
N 77 77 62 62 145 145 
Wald χ2 5437.76 
(0.0000) 
5444.58 
(0.0000) 
35097.87 
(0.0000) 
41630.24 
(0.0000) 
63603.07 
(0.0000) 
65375.43 
(0.0000) 
Adj. R2 0.9560 0.9561 0.9782 0.9785 0.9777 0.9778 
RMSE 0.0411 0.0413 0.0291 0.0270 0.0515 0.0510 
AIC -3.4722 -3.4474 -4.1423 -4.2804 -3.0340 -3.0536 
HQIC -3.3991 -3.3622 -4.0614 -4.1861 -2.9732 -2.9785 
l 139.6788 139.7264 134.4098 139.6925 228.3977 230.3859 G� 15.0264 15.0264 39.5827 39.5827 26.4080 26.4080 
G*  17.25  29.39  20.64 
G*-G�  2.22  -10.19  -5.77 
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 Our results show the presence of a non-linear relationship between 
the size of public sector (measured by the share of government expenditure 
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over GDP) and the economic growth rate for Italy. In general, regardless of 
the data used – here, those of Forte (2011), in other analyses those of the 
European Commission – and the temporal subdivisions, the presence of a 
parabolic dynamic between variables emerges. 
 Therefore, for Italy, a space of considerable manoeuvre might be 
evidenced since growth incentives can be pursued for a dual route. Both 
expenditure and tax cuts concur to the strengthening of economic activity in 
the first case as BARS effect, in the second as a supply-side effect, and a 
demand effect compatible with the balance of payment equilibrium. 
Reducing the tax burden, if a Laffer effect is triggered, it would improve the 
state of public finances by increasing revenue (EC, 2011). 
 It should be noted that the prescriptions of policies arising from these 
analyses cast doubt about the existence of a trade-off between austerity and 
growth that the policy-makers would face. This is because the plans of fiscal 
consolidation – if the BARS and Laffer curves worked – would contribute in 
achieving both objectives. 
 The previous results should be combined with those concerning the 
composition of expenditure (Forte and Magazzino, 2014; Magazzino, 
2012b). Since no item of public expenditure Granger causes aggregate 
income, the cuts in public expenditure should not have a negative impact on 
growth. Therefore, reallocating the public resources from an unproductive to 
a more productive items (R&D or public investment), it would stimulate 
long-run economic growth. In other words, in modifying the public 
expenditure composition and varying the volume of each chapter, one could 
obtain the effect of a more pronounced growth. 
 Moreover, public expenditure cuts contribute to the achievement of 
the primary balance surplus and debt reduction, within a wider framework of 
fiscal consolidation. Without mentioning the relevant structural reforms of 
which Italy has a clear necessity, they were able to restructure public 
expenditure and promote economic growth: the Welfare State reform, the 
revision of the tax system, the reduction of the fiscal churning, the justice 
reform, the reorganization of pension system, the labour market reform, the 
revision of education system, and the new institutional architecture with a 
simplification of policy framework (Bavetta and Navarra, 2012). 
Nevertheless, these subjects were beyond the scope of this study. 
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Appendix  
Table A. Exploratory data analyses (Italy, 1861-2008) 
Notes: CV: coefficient of variation; IQR: Inter-Quartile Range; SD: Standard Deviation. 
1861-1876 
Variable CV Skewness Median IQR SD 
Economic growth rate 3.2545 0.9174 2.7608 5.8915 7.1611 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.5387 0.6114 15.2095 18.8061 10.821 
Public revenue/GDP 0.4663 0.6403 12.8458 15.3227 8.1528 
Effective deficit/GDP -1.6375 -2.1413 -1.1815 5.6642 6.9637 
Public debt/GDP 0.4056 0.0385 75.9535 44.5971 29.5563 
Inflation 4.0474 8.1562 2.1289 7.0422 34.8721 
Population 0.2388 0.1570 37023 15596 9285.91 
1877-1895 
Economic growth rate 5.1324 -0.2472 0.7696 4.0353 3.2563 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.1329 0.3078 10.9724 2.0093 1.4676 
Public revenue/GDP 0.1218 0.4951 11.0643 1.6773 1.3459 
Effective deficit/GDP -2.1325 -0.8478 -0.1099 0.5341 0.4292 
Public debt/GDP 0.1056 -0.3456 91.6181 13.6611 9.6999 
Inflation -3.2716 0.1440 -1.5192 5.8852 3.3832 
Population 0.0394 0.0251 30101 2208 1185.05 
1896-1914 
Economic growth rate 2.6920 -0.1176 1.6319 6.9653 5.6956 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.1314 2.7907 11.1354 1.3477 1.4932 
Public revenue/GDP 0.0680 0.5326 11.5154 1.3678 0.7773 
Effective deficit/GDP -7.5627 -3.5542 0.2268 0.6018 1.4019 
Public debt/GDP 0.1560 0.2829 87.0792 21.7926 13.3320 
Inflation 1.6530 0.6818 0.4435 2.3703 1.4125 
Population 0.0421 0.1100 34205 2779 1443.29 
1919-1939 
Economic growth rate 1.6320 -0.1243 0.9172 6.0165 4.0453 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.3779 0.7439 19.5085 10.5676 8.0150 
Public revenue/GDP 0.3171 1.3734 18.0678 4.2508 6.2206 
Effective deficit/GDP -1.1351 -1.0639 -3.2797 7.5358 5.3639 
Public debt/GDP 0.2555 0.7129 90.7814 49.9243 25.6393 
Inflation 3.2132 1.1910 1.5293 10.8532 9.7148 
Population 0.0579 -0.4350 41202 3281 2377.93 
1946-1972 
Economic growth rate 1.1386 4.3673 5.6227 2.1507 8.2095 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.1765 -0.5013 28.4000 6.3999 5.0294 
Public revenue/GDP 0.2476 -1.1737 27.3000 7.3000 6.1570 
Effective deficit/GDP -0.8559 -1.5785 -2.4742 2.8335 2.7623 
Public debt/GDP 0.1650 1.2035 30.9666 4.7109 5.2070 
Inflation 1.8490 4.2230 4.2482 3.6188 11.7121 
Population 0.0518 0.1182 50023 4713 2598.90 
1973-1992 
Economic growth rate 0.7679 -0.0023 2.9809 2.3984 2.2256 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.1314 -0.2669 48.4000 9.6999 6.0921 
Public revenue/GDP 0.1305 0.0468 37.0751 7.0779 4.6818 
Effective deficit/GDP -0.2755 -0.1709 -10.7359 4.9351 3.0262 
Public debt/GDP 0.2516 0.3784 66.2730 33.5507 18.2024 
Inflation 0.4699 0.0704 11.5132 10.5000 5.6441 
Population 0.0076 -1.4264 56564 474.50 426.49 
1993-2008 
Economic growth rate 0.9668 -0.2818 1.4869 1.3819 1.2312 
Public expenditure/GDP 0.0550 1.1336 48.8000 3.3500 2.7414 
Public revenue/GDP 0.0225 0.2808 44.9959 1.6373 1.0149 
Effective deficit/GDP -0.8877 -0.6210 -2.5424 3.7764 2.9912 
Public debt/GDP 0.0606 0.4043 108.9798 11.1342 6.7447 
Inflation 0.4290 1.0677 2.4327 2.1676 1.1452 
Population 0.0194 0.9445 56977.50 1717 1121.95 
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Table B. Correlation matrix (Italy, 1861-2008) 
 y G T D B p Population u Openness 
y 1         
G -
0.0265 
1        
T -
0.0513 
0.9565 1       
D -
0.2309 
-
0.5581 
-
0.3471 
1      
B -
0.3119 
0.1165 -
0.1426 
-
0.0931 
1     
p -
0.4570 
0.1537 -
0.0343 
-
0.4967 
-
0.0083 
1    
Population 0.1261 0.8577 0.8376 -
0.3137 
-
0.1056 
0.1236 1   
u -
0.3284 
0.5750 0.4597 -
0.4148 
0.5882 0.0007 0.3562 1  
Openness -
0.6976 
0.8408 0.9417 -
0.0899 
0.9178 -
0.0877 
0.8999 0.3763 1 
Notes: Bonferroni’s adjustment applied. 
 
Figure 2. Public debt and fluctuating debt (%, Italy, 1862-2008) 
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Figure 3. Effective public deficit and unemployment rate (%, Italy, 1945-2008) 
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